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Do management EPS forecasts allow returns to reflect future earnings? 
Implications for the continuation of management’s quarterly earnings guidance  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using 18,253 firm-year observations from 1998 through 2003, we build on literature suggesting 
that more informative disclosures allow returns to better reflect future earnings, and test whether 
management earnings per share forecasts and their characteristics influence the future earnings 
response coefficient (FERC). We find that FERCs are greater for forecasting firms and when 
forecasts are more frequent or precise. We suggest that more frequent and more precise forecasts 
assist investors in better predicting future earnings. Importantly, we find that quarterly and short-
term forecasts incrementally increase the association between returns and future earnings beyond 
annual and long-term forecasts; thus, even short-term, quarterly forecasts allow investors to form 
better expectations about future earnings. This suggests a benefit of quarterly earnings forecasts 
possibly overlooked in recommendations from the United States Chamber of Commerce, CFA 
Institute, Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, and The Conference Board to 
eliminate quarterly earnings guidance. 
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Do management EPS forecasts allow returns to reflect future earnings? 
Implications for the continuation of management’s quarterly earnings guidance  
 
1 Introduction 
 Earnings forecasts are voluntary disclosures and managers have considerable discretion 
when issuing these forecasts. For example, they choose the frequency, precision, and horizon of 
their forecasts. These choices can influence the market‟s ability to interpret the forecasts and to 
reflect the implications of the forecasts in current stock prices. In addition, the forecast 
characteristics may provide a signal about managers‟ confidence in their forecasts, assisting 
investors in better understanding the relation between the forecasts and future earnings, and 
allowing them to price securities accordingly. In this study, we examine whether management 
earnings per share (EPS) forecasts and forecast characteristics are associated with the ability of 
current period returns to reflect information in future earnings. We follow prior literature in 
calling this relation the future earnings response coefficient (FERC) or the informativeness of 
stock price. Studying this association is important because more informative stock prices can 
lead to more efficient resource allocation (Durnev et al. 2003; Fishman and Hagerty 1989).1 
Our study is motivated by recent calls for the permanent elimination of quarterly earnings 
guidance by the United States (U.S.) Chamber of Commerce, the CFA Institute, the Business 
Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics, and The Conference Board (which we collectively call 
“the Chamber of Commerce and others”) (CFA Institute 2006; Chamber of Commerce 2007; 
McCafferty 2007).2 In addition, the Center for Audit Quality, a nonprofit group affiliated with 
                                                 
1 Fishman and Hagerty (1989) show that information efficiency of a firm‟s stock price is linked to the efficiency of 
its investment/production decisions, suggesting that improved stock price informativeness benefits both the firm and 
the economy.  
2 Interestingly, some companies, including Berkshire Hathaway, Coca-Cola, McDonald‟s, Pfizer, and The 
Washington Post Co., have discontinued the practice of forecasting quarterly earnings. 
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the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, has announced its support for the 
elimination of quarterly guidance (Burns 2007). Moreover, a recent survey by the Financial 
Executives International shows that chief financial officers strongly favour annual forecasts over 
quarterly earnings forecasts (Johnson 2007).  Concerns about management incentives resulting 
from quarterly earnings guidance also appear regularly in the business press.3  
Opponents of quarterly guidance claim that the practice is harmful because of the 
pressure that managers feel to meet or beat their forecasts. Because the market assumes that a 
company is doing poorly when a forecast is missed, investors lose confidence (McCafferty 
2007), placing management under intense pressure to meet their forecasts (Barsky 2002; Fuller 
and Jensen 2002; Oakley 2002; Taub 2006). Thus, managers may sacrifice long-term company 
health in order to meet short-term earnings goals (Donohue 2005; Fuller and Jensen 2002; 
Horowitz 2005; Koller and Rajan 2006; Chamber of Commerce 2007). Moreover, opponents 
believe that it is costly for managers to provide and meet quarterly earnings targets. The costs 
include wasted effort in preparing forecasts, neglect of long-term growth opportunities, investor 
overreactions to missed forecasts, incentives for firm privatization to avoid the pressure to 
provide guidance, the temptation to manage earnings, and ongoing pressure to update previously 
released information (CFA Institute 2006; Chamber of Commerce 2007; Institute of 
Management & Administration (IOMA) 2003).4, 5   
                                                 
3 For example, a story in the March 19, 2007 edition of InvestmentNews states “[i]f public companies adopted the 
policy of no quarterly guidance, the result might well be a dramatic improvement in the long-term performance of 
American corporations and the economy. Studies have shown that pressure to provide quarterly guidance …distorts 
investment decisions and policies of corporate management teams and imposes a short-term mind-set on them.” 
Also see “The market game” in The Wall Street Journal (May 8, 2002), “The last quarter of the guidance game” in 
CFO.com (March 17, 2006). “Ditch guidance” in CFO.com (March 30, 2006), “Dump quarterly guidance” in 
CFO.com (July 25, 2006), “Stop playing the guidance game” in Directorship (September 2007), and “Corporations 
should stop giving quarterly earnings guidance” in the Idaho Business Review (September 24, 2007). 
4 Consistent with significant costs for forecasting firms, Cheng et al. (2005) find that frequent forecasters invest less 
in research and development and experience lower long-term earnings growth than firms that infrequently forecast. 
Moreover, Krehmeyer et al. (2006) report that among a group of over 400 financial executives, 80% state that they 
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Proponents of quarterly guidance counter that its discontinuance will not eliminate 
management pressure to meet quarterly earnings targets because analyst EPS forecasts will 
continue to influence investor expectations. Moreover, eliminating quarterly guidance will 
restrict management‟s ability to correct inappropriate analyst forecasts (Johnson 2007). Because 
at least half of all public firms systematically or occasionally issue quarterly guidance, the 
elimination of quarterly guidance would affect many firms (National Investor Relations Institute 
(NIRI) 2007).  
We suggest a benefit which might arise from earnings guidance by examining the impact 
of management forecasts on the FERC. Accordingly, we study both quarterly and annual 
forecasts because quarterly forecasts have been criticized but annual forecasts are generally 
considered useful (CFA Institute 2006; Chamber of Commerce 2007). Thus, we compare the 
benefits of quarterly versus annual forecasts, and compare these with cases where no forecast is 
issued. We also consider short- and long-term forecasts since this forecast characteristic may 
affect the FERC and because concern about short-term forecasts (rather than quarterly forecasts) 
may in fact underlie the objections of opponents of earning guidance.6 Much of the management 
forecast literature studies outcomes of forecast characteristics but how these characteristics affect 
the ability of forecasts to allow future earnings news to be reflected in returns has not been 
previously addressed. Thus, we also study management forecast precision and frequency since 
                                                                                                                                                             
would decrease discretionary spending and 50% state that they would sacrifice value creation to meet earnings 
forecasts. 
5 Opponents also suggest that if managers stop providing quarterly guidance, analysts and investors will seek out 
information elsewhere and managers may disclose better quality (other) information (Harbert 2003; Nolan 2006). 
Moreover, according to a CFA Institute survey, 76% of investment analysts would prefer more in-depth disclosures 
about long-term plans than continuing quarterly earnings guidance (Krehmeyer et al. 2006; Pozen 2007). 
6 We distinguish between four forecast types. Short-term, quarterly forecasts are of quarterly EPS for upcoming 
quarters in the current fiscal year; long-term, quarterly forecasts are of quarterly EPS for quarters in a future fiscal 
year; short-term, annual forecasts are of annual EPS in the current fiscal year; and long-term, annual forecasts are of 
annual EPS in a future fiscal year.  
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they are important in determining investor responses to management forecasts and should be 
especially helpful in informing market participants about future earnings.  
Although prior studies examine short-window market reactions (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift 
1984; Anilowski et al. 2007; Han and Wild 1991; Hutton et al. 2003; Pownall et al. 1993) and 
analyst reactions (e.g., Baginski and Hassell 1990; Jennings 1987) to management forecasts, 
investigating the impact of management forecasts and their characteristics on the FERC provides 
insights beyond those available from existing studies. Rather than assessing whether (and how) 
investors and analysts react to management forecasts, we ask whether these forecasts allow 
investors to adjust securities prices in a way that is consistent with future earnings realizations. 
Here, managers must provide relatively accurate information in their forecasts (so that prices 
move to reflect future earnings realizations) and investors must view the forecasts as credible (so 
that they act on the forecasts). Thus, our analyses can be thought of as a joint test of whether 
managers provide relatively accurate information and whether investors view this information as 
credible.7  
 We expect FERCs to be greater for forecasting firms, for firms issuing more frequent and 
more precise forecasts, for firms issuing annual forecasts, and for firms issuing long-term 
forecasts. In addition, we expect that even quarterly and short-term forecasts will result in greater 
FERCs relative to non-forecasts. Empirical tests, using 18,253 firm-year observations (7,353 
observations with forecasts and 10,900 observations with no forecasts) from 1998 through 2003 
(through 2006 for data on future earnings and returns), strongly support our predictions. First, 
FERCs are greater for firms that forecast earnings; current returns are more strongly positively 
                                                 
7 Note that the ERC measures how much the market values one dollar of current earnings on average, so the ERC is 
unable to inform us about how well investors can predict future earnings. Our goal is to determine whether the 
market‟s future earnings expectations, as implied in stock returns, reflect the future earnings realizations more when 
managers forecast (and whether this varies with the forecast characteristics). Thus, the FERC is a means to address a 
question that cannot be addressed using short-window ERC tests. 
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associated with future earnings for forecasting firms than for non-forecasting firms. Second, 
FERCs are greater when firms issue more frequent or more precise forecasts (e.g., point or range 
forecasts versus minimum / maximum or qualitative forecasts). Third, FERCs are greater for 
firms issuing annual or quarterly forecasts than for non-forecasting firms, even when the forecast 
horizon is short. Fourth, FERCs are greater for firms issuing short-term forecasts than for non-
forecasting firms, even when the forecasts are of quarterly-only EPS. In contrast, forecast 
characteristics rarely influence the degree to which returns reflect current-period earnings (i.e., 
the earnings response coefficient (ERC)). Thus, it is important to consider the FERC, and not just 
the ERC, when examining the effects of a management forecast. We perform various sensitivity 
analyses controlling for firm characteristics and endogeneity and find that our results are robust.  
Our findings reveal that management forecasts affect the ability of returns to reflect 
future earnings. In related work, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) 
show that FERCs increase with the informativeness of firm disclosures. While these studies 
address the informativeness of disclosures in general, to our knowledge, no prior studies 
demonstrate a relation between management forecasts and FERCs. As such, in our study we 
document evidence regarding benefits of management earnings guidance and advocate that 
managers forecast earnings and issue more frequent and more precise forecasts. Because 
quarterly forecasts allow returns to better reflect future earnings, quarterly forecasts are 
beneficial in this regard. This benefit should not be overlooked in the debate about whether to 
eliminate quarterly earnings guidance. In addition, we suggest that managers can affect the 
amount of information asymmetry through their choice of forecast characteristics. 
 Next, we present our theoretical development and hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our 
sample selection and models. Section 4 presents empirical results, and the last section concludes.  
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2 Theory and hypotheses 
Prior work on the association between ERCs and management forecasts focuses on past 
ERCs (i.e., on prior year associations between earnings and contemporaneous returns). Lennox 
and Park (2006) find that forecasting firms have greater past ERCs than non-forecasting firms 
and argue that firms with greater past ERCs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts. However, 
their research addresses management‟s decision to issue forecasts rather than the consequences 
of that decision. In contrast, we investigate whether current returns better reflect future earnings 
when firms issue forecasts. Focusing on the FERC, rather than the current or past ERC, is 
informative for our research question because “the change in (expected) future earnings may be 
due to a shock that has no effect on current earnings” (Tucker and Zarowin 2006, 252). These 
shocks would not be captured by current earnings (or by the ERC), but will be reflected in 
returns and would be captured by the FERC. 
2.1 The effect of forecast issuances on the FERC  
 Research suggests that managers forecast earnings when their expectations for future 
performance differ from those of investors (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Kasznik and Lev 1995; 
Penman 1980; Skinner 1994) so the market reacts to EPS forecasts (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; Han 
and Wild 1991; Hutton et al. 2003; Pownall et al. 1993). Moreover, analysts revise their forecasts 
in response to management forecasts (Baginski and Hassell 1990; Jennings 1987). Thus, 
investors and analysts use information in management forecasts to assess firm values.  
When disclosure quality is high, analysts and investors should be better able to predict 
future performance. Consistent with this, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that analyst forecasts 
become more accurate and forecast dispersion decreases as analyst ratings of disclosure quality 
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increase. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) suggest that expanded 
disclosure helps investors to better predict future performance by “bringing the future forward” 
and, thus, FERCs are greater when disclose quality is higher. To measure disclosure quality, they 
use analyst ratings of disclosure quality as reported by the Association for Investment 
Management and Research (AIMR).8 AIMR scores, which are based on analyst perceptions, are 
meant to reflect the quality information in annual and quarterly reports and other sources. 
However, “the AIMR rankings are probably a poor measure of management earnings forecasts 
since there is no mention of them in the documentation of the AIMR scoring system and the 
AIMR has opposed any requirement that management forecast earnings” (Lundholm and Myers 
2002, 820). Moreover, AIMR scores are based on relative rankings within an industry and, thus, 
do not reflect the amount of disclosure during the year (Lundholm and Myers 2002). Finally, the 
AIMR scores only relatively large firms, so prior results may not be generalizable to smaller 
firms.9  
 We first test whether FERCs are greater for forecasting firms relative to non-forecasting 
firms. Forecasts are one of the most efficient ways that managers can communicate their 
expectations to the market. Because they have private information about future business plans, 
EPS forecasts may help investors to better predict future earnings. Thus, future earnings should 
be more accurately reflected in returns and, as a result, FERCs should be greater, for forecasting 
firms. Our first alternative hypothesis is: 
H1a: Firms issuing earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those not issuing 
forecasts, all else equal. 
                                                 
8 Similarly, Ettredge et al. (2005) find that the adoption of SFAS No. 131 on segment reporting increased FERCs 
and Orpurt and Zang (2009) find that FERCs are greater when firms prepare their cash flow statements using the 
direct approach. 
9 The median market value of equity for the firms in Lundholm and Myers (2002) is $1,267 million versus $483 
million in our study. Their sample includes approximately 300 firms per year versus our approximately 3,000 firms 
per year.  
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2.2 The effect of forecast frequency on the FERC  
 Regulators passed the Safe Harbour Rule in 1979 and the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995 to protect managers from litigation related to forecast errors and to 
induce them to release more frequent and more precise forward-looking information (Hirst et al. 
2008).10 However, evidence on whether forecast frequency has increased over time is mixed. 
Johnson et al. (2001) find more firms issue forecasts and firms issue more forecasts since the 
passage of the PSLRA but Warner (2006) finds that forecast frequency decreased following the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  
 Forecast frequency can affect the market‟s reaction to management forecasts. Hutton and 
Stocken (2007) find that investor reactions to EPS forecasts are stronger for managers issuing 
more frequent and accurate prior forecasts. They suggest that frequency is important for forecast 
credibility. King et al. (1990) argue that more frequent forecasts should results in larger ERCs. 
We argue that forecast frequency should also influence FERCs because higher frequency should 
improve perceived forecast credibility and help investors to update their future earnings 
expectations. Our second alternative hypothesis is: 
H2a: Firms issuing more frequent earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those 
issuing less frequent forecasts, all else equal. 
 
2.3 The effect of forecast precision on the FERC  
 Managers also choose forecast precision, presumably by comparing the benefits and costs 
of disclosing precise information (Baginksi and Hassell 1997). Managers issue less precise 
forecasts when they are more uncertain about the accuracy of their forecasts (Baginski et al. 
1993; Choi et al. 2009). Thus, investors are likely less able to interpret the information in 
imprecise forecasts, and are less likely to understand their implications for future earnings. If 
                                                 
10 Increasing disclosure frequency can alter the timing and the content of disclosures (Botosan and Harris 2000).   
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investors understand that precision is related to uncertainty, their reactions to less precise 
forecasts will be weaker.11  
 Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam (1996) show the magnitude of the 
market‟s response to a disclosure is positively related to its precision. Consistent with this, 
Skinner (1994) and Baginski and Hassell (1997) suggest that managers issue less precise 
forecasts to dampen the market reaction to bad forecast news. Thus, more precise forecasts 
should reveal more about management‟s expectations (Choi et al. 2009; Karamanou and Vafeas 
2005) and allow investors to make better prediction of future earnings. Our third alternative 
hypothesis is: 
H3a: Firms issuing more precise earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those 
issuing less precise forecasts, all else equal. 
 
2.4 The effect of forecast type (annual vs. quarterly) on the FERC  
 The Chamber of Commerce and others call for eliminating quarterly forecasts but 
continuing annual forecasts. This implies that annual forecasts are beneficial but quarterly 
earnings forecasts are detrimental. We test these implications with the following (alternative) 
hypotheses: 
H4(i)a: Firms issuing annual earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those not 
issuing forecasts, all else equal. 
 
H4(ii)a: Firms issuing quarterly earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those 
not issuing forecasts, all else equal. 
 
Some of the quarterly forecasts in our sample are of long-term earnings. Since forecast horizon 
could be responsible for any observed relation between FERCs and the issuance of quarterly 
                                                 
11 Atiase et al. (2005) and Pownall et al. (1993) do not find a relation between forecast precision and the magnitude 
of the market reaction but Baginski et al. (1993) find that the market reaction to a forecast surprise is increasing in 
forecast precision. 
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forecasts, we also compare FERCs of firms issuing only short-term, quarterly forecasts with 
FERCs of non-forecasting firms: 
H4(iii)a: Firms issuing short-term, quarterly earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs 
than those not issuing forecasts, all else equal. 
 
This is the most conservative test of the benefits associated with quarterly earnings guidance.  
2.5 The effect of forecast horizon (long- vs. short-term) on the FERC  
 Managers have incentives to make forecasts with varying horizons. They might make 
long-term forecasts to decrease the cost of capital,12 but make short-term forecasts to guide 
expectations to achievable levels.13 Choi and Ziebart (2004) suggest that managers use long-term 
forecasts (which are usually optimistic) to increase earnings expectations and use short-term 
forecasts (which are usually pessimistic) to guide expectations downward.  
We posit that while short-term forecasts (i.e., quarterly and annual forecasts within the 
current year) should help investors to predict short-term earnings, they may or may not help them 
to better predict long-term earnings. However, long-term forecasts should help investors to 
predict long-term earnings.14 Thus, we expect greater FERCs when long-term forecasts (annual 
and/or quarterly) are issued. Our fifth alternative hypothesis is: 
H5(i)a: Firms issuing long-term earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those 
not issuing forecasts, all else equal.  
 
Finally, we ask whether FERCs are greater for firms that issue only short-term forecasts 
relative to non-forecasting firms. Thus, we examine whether short-term forecasts result in greater 
FERCs after ruling out the possibility that greater FERCs are due to managers disclosing their 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Frankel et al. (1995), Healy et al. (1999), Healy 
and Palepu (2001), Lang and Lundholm (2000), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Marquardt and Wiedman (1998), and 
Welker (1995). 
13 See, for example, Cotter et al. (2006), Kasznik and McNichols (2002), Matsumoto (2002), and Richardson et al. 
(2004). 
14 This assumes that long-term forecasts are informative about long-term earnings realizations (i.e., that realizations 
are closer to forecasts than to pre-forecast market expectations). 
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long-term earnings expectations. Because earnings are serially correlated (Bernard and Thomas 
1990), even short-term forecasts could provide information about long-term earnings, allowing 
investors to price securities so that future earnings news is brought forward. The resulting 
alternative hypothesis is:   
H5(ii)a: Firms issuing short-term earnings forecasts will have greater FERCs than those 
not issuing forecasts, all else equal.  
 
H4(iii) and H5(ii) rely on the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings and 
cash flows (Dechow et al. 1998; Drake et al. 2009; Finger 1994; Kim and Kross 2005; Sloan 
1996). We expect short-term forecasts to allow stock prices to incorporate more information 
about (long-term) future earnings to the extent that the forecasts help investors to better predict 
future earnings.  
 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Model 
 The ability of returns to reflect future earnings can be tested using a model adapted by 
Lundholm and Myers (2002) from Collins et al. (1994): 
         3 
 Rt = b0 + b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + Σ (b3i Xt+i + b4i Rt+i) + εt     (1) 
                                                    i =1 
where for years t and i: 
Rt  = the cumulative return for fiscal year t; and 
X t = income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items deflated 
by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t. 
 
Following Lundholm and Myers (2002), we include three years of future earnings and 
estimate a condensed version of model (1). We combine three years of future returns (Rt+1, Rt+2, 
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and Rt+3) to form Rt3, and combine the next three years of earnings (Xt+1, Xt+2, and Xt+3) to form 
Xt3: 
Rt = b0 + b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3 + εt      (2) 
  
 where for year t:   
Rt3  = the cumulative return for fiscal years t+1 through t+3;  
X t3 = the sum of income available to common shareholders before extraordinary 
items for years t+1 through t+3 deflated by the market value of equity at the 
beginning of fiscal year t; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
We follow Collins et al. (1994) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and measure returns over the 
fiscal year.15 The change in earnings, ΔXt, often appears in the price-earnings relation under the 
assumption that earnings follow a random walk. Rather than restrict our specification by this 
assumption, we follow Lundholm and Myers (2002) and include Xt-1 and Xt.16 Consistent with 
the interpretation in Ettredge et al. (2005) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006), b2 is the ERC, where 
b2 reflects the relation between returns and contemporaneous earnings,17 and b3 is the FERC, 
which reflects the relation between returns and future earnings. Based on prior studies, we expect 
b1 to be negative and b2 and b3 to be positive. 
 To test our hypotheses, we extend model (2): 
Rt = b0 + b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3 + b5 Dt + b6 Dt * Xt-1 + b7 Dt*Xt + b8 Dt*Xt3  
+ b9 Dt*Rt3 + εt         (3) 
 
 where for year t: 
Dt  = a variable representing the characteristics of the forecast; Dt is either DF, LNF, 
PREC, DQF, DAF, DQF_ONLY, DAF_ONLY, DQA_JOINT, DCF, DLF, 
DCF_ONLY, DLF_ONLY, or DCL_JOINT; 
                                                 
15 Our results are robust to measuring returns with a three month lag as in Lundholm and Myers (2002).     
16 If b1 = -b2, earnings follow a random walk. 
17 See footnote 5 in Lundholm and Myers (2002) for a discussion of the alternative ERC definition and note that the 
inclusion of future earnings may confound the traditional interpretation of the ERC (Lundholm and Myers 2002). 
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DFt  = 1 if a management EPS forecast is issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
 
LNFt = the natural log of (one plus the number of forecasts issued during fiscal year t); 
 
PRECt = the average precision of the forecasts issued in fiscal year t; 
 
DQFt = 1 if a (short- or long-term) quarterly forecast is issued during fiscal year t, 0 
otherwise; 
 
DAFt = 1 if a (short- or long-term) annual forecast is issued during fiscal year t, 0 
otherwise; 
 
DQF_ONLYt = 1 if a (short- or long-term) quarterly forecast but no annual forecast is 
issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
 
DAF_ONLYt = 1 if a (short- or long-term) annual forecast but no quarterly forecast is 
issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
 
DQA_JOINTt = 1 if a (short- or long-term) quarterly forecast and a (short- or long-term) 
annual forecast are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
 
DCFt  = 1 if a short-term (quarterly or annual) forecast (i.e., a forecast for the current 
fiscal year) is issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise;  
 
DLFt  = 1 if a long-term (quarterly or annual) forecast (i.e., a forecast for a future fiscal 
year) is issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise;  
 
DCF_ONLYt  = 1 if a short-term (quarterly or annual) forecast but no long-term 
(quarterly or annual) forecast is issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise;  
 
DLF_ONLYt  = 1 if a long-term (quarterly or annual) forecast but no short-term 
(quarterly or annual) forecast is issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise;  
 
DCL_JOINTt = 1 if a (quarterly or annual) short-term forecast and a (quarterly or 
annual) long-term forecast are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
In model (3), Dt is either DF, LNF, PREC, DQF, DAF, DQF_ONLY, DAF_ONLY, DQA_JOINT, 
DCF, DLF, DCF_ONLY, DLF_ONLY, or DCL_JOINT.  
DF is an indicator variable for the issuance of a management forecast; if FERCs are 
greater for firms that forecast earnings (see H1a), b8 will be positive. LNF is increasing in the 
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number of forecasts; if FERCs increase with forecast frequency (see H2a), b8 will be positive. 
We classify all forecasts into point, range, minimum / maximum, or qualitative forecasts using 
First Call‟s codes for Company Issued Guidelines (CIGCODEQ) following Anilowski et al. 
(2007). PREC is the average forecast precision, calculated by awarding a score of 4 to point 
forecasts, 3 to range forecasts, 2 to minimum / maximum forecasts, and 1 to qualitative 
statements, and averaging the score for each firm-year observation.18 If FERCs increase with 
forecast precision (see H3a), b8 will be positive.  
DQF, DAF, DQF_ONLY, DAF_ONLY, and DQA_JOINT are forecast type variables. We 
form indicator variables for observations with forecasts of quarterly EPS, annual EPS, quarterly-
only EPS, annual-only EPS, and both quarterly and annual EPS, respectively. We test whether 
the coefficient estimates on the interactions between these variables and Xt3 are different from 
zero to determine whether forecast type matters to the FERC.     
DCF, DLF, DCF_ONLY, DLF_ONLY, and DCL_JOINT are the forecast horizon 
variables. We form indicator variables for observations with forecasts of short-term EPS, long-
term EPS, short-term-only EPS, long-term-only EPS, and both short- and long-term EPS, 
respectively. We test whether the coefficient estimates on the interactions between these 
variables and Xt3 are different from zero to determine whether forecast horizon matters to the 
FERC.      
We also follow prior literature (Ettredge et al. 2005; Lundholm and Myers 2002; Orpurt 
and Zang 2009; Tucker and Zarowin 2006) and extend model (3) to include additional 
explanatory variables related to FERCs: 
                                                 
18 Thus, if a firm makes a point forecast and a minimum forecast in a given year, the value of PREC is 3 (i.e., [4+2] / 
2). In untabulated analyses, we alternatively measure forecast precision as the proportion of forecasts made in the 
year that are quantitative (i.e., point and range forecasts). Our results and inferences are qualitatively unchanged. 
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 Rt = b0 + b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3 + b5 Dt + b6 Dt*Xt-1 + b7 Dt*Xt  + b8 Dt*Xt3  
+ b9 Dt*Rt3 + c1 SIZEt  + c2 SIZEt*Xt3 + c3 LOSSt  + c4 LOSSt*Xt3 + c5 GROWTHt   
+ c6 GROWTHt*Xt3 + c7 EARNSTDt + c8 EARNSTDt*Xt3 + c9 NANALt   
+ c10 NANALt*Xt3 + εt         (4) 
 
 where for year t:   
SIZEt  = the natural log of the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal       
 year t; 
 
LOSSt   = 1 if Xt3 is negative, 0 otherwise; 
 
GROWTHt = the percentage growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t+1;  
 
EARNSTDt  = the standard deviation of X for years t through t+3; 
 
NANALt   = the natural log of (one plus the number of analysts following the firm in  
 the month prior to the earnings announcement for fiscal year t), from the 
 First Call Analyst Forecast database; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
We add SIZEt and the number of analysts, NANALt, to control for differences in the information 
environment across firms. We include an indicator variable, LOSSt, because negative future 
earnings may be more difficult than positive future earnings to predict. We include GROWTHt 
because high-growth firms tend to have greater FERCs. Lastly, we include the volatility of future 
earnings, EARNSTDt, since volatile earnings are more difficult to predict.19  
 Finally, we note that self-selection and endogeneity are important concerns because 
managers choose whether to issue a forecast, as well as the forecast characteristics. We address 
these concerns by: 1) employing a Heckman self-selection model; 2) performing subsample 
analyses to alleviate self-selection concerns; and 3) using a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
estimation procedure based on prior studies (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chen at al. 2008; 
Karamanou and Vefeas 2005). We discuss these tests in Section 4.  
                                                 
19 As a robustness test, we convert these raw continuous control variables to fractional rankings in their (two-digit 
SIC) industries and years. The results are qualitatively similar. We tabulate results using raw values because the 
first-stage of our two-stage least-squares model (explained later) uses raw values. 
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3.2 Sample and data 
 
Our sample comes from the intersection of the 2007 Annual Industrial Compustat files, 
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database, and the 2007 First Call Analyst 
Forecast Database. Management EPS forecasts for the current and future fiscal years come from 
First Call‟s Issued Guidelines Database. We begin with forecasts made in 1998 because data in 
First Call appears to be incomplete prior to 1998 (Anilowski et al. 2007), and end with forecasts 
made in 2003 because we require stock returns and earnings data for three years following the 
forecasts. We include only those firms appearing in the First Call Analyst Forecast Database 
during the same fiscal year, so if First Call has analyst forecast data but no management forecast 
data in a given year, we assume that management did not issue a forecasts in the year. To 
minimize the effect of outliers, we follow Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and delete observations 
that are in the top or bottom one percent of the distributions of past, current, and future earnings, 
and of current and future returns. The final sample consists of 18,253 firm-year observations; 
7,353 firm-year observations issued a total of 27,767 management forecasts during our sample 
period, and the remaining 10,900 firm-year observations did not issue management forecasts in 
the year but are covered by First Call. We label the 7,353 observations that provided forecasts 
“the restricted sample” and perform subsample analyses with these observations. 
3.3 Sample description 
 Table 1, Panel A reports the number of observations by year. The average sample firm 
issues approximately 1.5 forecasts per year and the average forecasting firms (in the restricted 
sample) issue more than three forecasts per year. The average number of forecasts is increasing 
over the sample period.  
[Insert table 1 about here] 
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To investigate whether trends in forecast precision exist, we assign point, range, 
minimum / maximum, and qualitative statements scores of 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, and 
calculate average forecast precision as the mean firm score in each year. PREC averages 2.885 
overall and tends to increase over our sample period. 
 Table 1, Panel B describes the distribution of annual versus quarterly forecasts by year. 
More firms issue quarterly-only forecasts than annual-only forecasts, and the number of firms 
that issue both quarterly and annual forecasts is increasing, suggesting that eliminating earnings 
guidance would affect many firms.  
Table 1, Panel C describes forecast precision of individual forecasts by forecast type 
(annual versus quarterly). Range forecasts are most frequent: 17,334 (or 62 percent) are range 
forecasts, 6,145 (22 percent) are point forecasts, 2,211 (8 percent) are qualitative forecasts, and 
2,077 (7 percent) are minimum / maximum forecasts. The distributions of forecast precision are 
similar for annual and quarterly forecasts except that a greater proportion of quarterly forecasts 
are minimum / maximum rather than qualitative.    
3.4 Descriptive statistics and correlations   
 Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the full and restricted samples. 
Approximately 40 percent of all firm-year observations issue at least one forecast (mean DF = 
0.4028). For the restricted sample, approximately 32 percent issue only quarterly forecasts 
(DQF_ONLY), 26 percent issue only annual forecasts (DAF_ONLY), and 43 percent issue both 
quarterly and annual forecasts (DQA_JOINT).20 The full (restricted) sample issue an average of 
                                                 
20 Untabulated results indicate that in the restricted sample, most forecasts are only for the current fiscal year or for a 
quarter in the current year (mean DCF_ONLY = 0.7796), and approximately 20 percent are for both current and 
future years (mean DCL_JOINT = 0.2025). Long-term forecasts only for future years or for quarters in future years 
are rare (mean DLF_ONLY = 0.0178).  
 
 
20 
1.521 (3.776) forecasts per year [mean LNF = 0.5497 (1.3645)].21 Untabulated tests show that 
the median market value and number of analysts following for our restricted sample (at $837 
million and 6 analysts) are greater than for our full sample (at $483 million and 4 analysts). We 
control for size and the number of analysts following the firm in our multivariate analyses. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
Table 2, Panel B presents Pearson correlations for our full sample. Xt-1, Xt, and Xt3 are 
highly correlated, as expected, as are Rt3 and Xt3. Among the control variables, analyst following 
(NANAL) is highly correlated with SIZE (ρ = 0.700) but no other correlations are very high.22 
Untabulated results show that PREC is not highly correlated with Rt, Xt-1, Xt, Xt3, or Rt3 in the 
restricted sample. Moreover, the largest correlation between PREC and the control variables is 
small (ρ = -0.1050 with LOSS). Correlations for the restricted sample are qualitatively similar 
(untabulated). 
 
4 Empirical results 
4.1 The effect of forecast issuances on the FERC (H1) 
 Using models (2) through (4), we perform ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
analyses to test whether firms that issue forecasts have greater FERCs than non-forecasting firms 
(see H1a). In all analyses, we correct for heteroskedasticity following White (1980) and perform 
firm-level clustering to control for correlation that may exist because multiple observations from 
the same firm are in our dataset (Petersen 2009). Results using the full sample appear in Table 3. 
Column 1 presents the traditional FERC model (model (2)), and Column 2 presents our basic 
                                                 
21 The average of LNF is calculated after the values are logged. The raw average number of forecasts is reported in 
Table 1, Panel A. 
22 The correlation between LNF and DF is very high (ρ = 0.878) but these variables do not enter the same regression. 
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FERC model that tests for the effects of forecasts (model (3)). Finally, Column 3 presents the full 
FERC model that tests for effects of forecasts and includes control variables (model (4)).  
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 In model (2) in Column 1, we test whether our results are similar to those in prior studies. 
The coefficient on Xt (the ERC) is positive (b2 = 1.2202, p = 0.0001) so returns are increasing in 
current earnings. In addition, the coefficient on Xt3 (the FERC) is positive (b3 = 0.2780, p = 
0.0001) so returns are increasing in future earnings, consistent with Lundholm and Myers (2002).  
Model (3) in Column 2 includes the interaction between DF and the other variables in our 
basic FERC model. The coefficient of interest (i.e., the estimate on DFt*Xt3) is positive (b8 = 
0.5513, p = 0.0001), implying that the returns of forecasting firms more strongly reflect future 
earnings than do returns of non-forecasting firms. The results strongly support H1a and suggest 
that earnings forecasts provide information which investors can use to adjust securities prices to 
better reflect future earnings news. 
Model (4) in Column 3 includes control variables. Our main result remains: the 
coefficient on DFt*Xt3 is positive (0.3712, p = 0.0001), so management forecasts allow returns to 
reflect future earnings. Among the control variables, we find that FERCs are greater for larger 
firms, growing firms, and firms followed by more analysts, and are smaller for loss firms and for 
firms with higher earnings variability, consistent with prior studies.  
 Note that in Columns 2 and 3, the coefficients on DFt*Xt are not significant, suggesting 
that the management forecasts do not influence the ERC. Thus, it is important to consider the 
FERC when assessing the impact of management forecasts because the ERC does not fully 
capture their informativeness.  
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4.2 Self-selection issues for H1 
 Since management forecasts are voluntary, our tests of H1 are subject to self-selection 
bias. To address this potential endogeneity, we conduct the following analyses. 
First, we follow Heckman (1979) and model the decision to issue forecasts in a first-stage 
model. Our first-stage probit model follows Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Chen at al. (2008): 
DFt = d0 + d1 INSTt + d2 BDINDt + d3 D_CAPt + d4 DISPt + d5 BETAt + d6 LITt + d7 ROAt  
 + d8 SIZEt  + d9 LOSSt  + d10 GROWTHt + d11 EARNSTDt  + d12 NANALt  
+ Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εt     (5) 
 
 where for year t:   
INSTt = the percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of fiscal  year t; 
 
BDINDt   = the percentage of independent directors at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
we define independent directors as those who are not corporate executives 
and have no business relationship with the firm; 
 
D_CAPt  = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the year t is greater than 5 
percent of total assets, and 0 otherwise;  
 
DISPt   = analyst forecast dispersion in year t, measured as the standard deviation of 
one-year-ahead EPS forecasts, scaled by the absolute mean forecast, using 
the most recent consensus forecast before the end of year t; 
 
BETAt   = equity beta for fiscal year t; 
 
LITt  = 1 for firms in high litigation risk industries (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-
3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 8731-8734), and 0 otherwise; 
 
ROAt   = return on assets for fiscal year t; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
To improve the efficacy of the first-stage selection model, we add variables that are not in the 
second-stage model. Prior studies find that the likelihood of management forecasts increases 
with institutional ownership (INSTt), board independence (BDINDt), and substantial external 
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financing (D_CAPt) (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chen at al. 2008; Karamanou and Vefeas 2005). We 
find that these variables are very weakly associated with the FERC.23  
The first-stage estimation results appear in the Appendix. Using 13,420 firm-year 
observations with available data, we obtain the inverse Mills ratio (Millst). In the second-stage, 
we follow prior studies where the group indicator variable (DFt in our case) is endogenous (e.g., 
Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Orpurt and Zang 2009; Oswald and Zarowin 2007) and include 
Millst and its interaction with DFt to allow the coefficient on Millst to vary between the forecast 
and non-forecast groups. The results from this second-stage model appear in Column 4 of Table 
3, Panel A. Although the coefficient on Millst is significant, the coefficient on Millst*DFt is not, 
indicating that self-selection bias, to the extent that it exists, does not significantly affect our 
results. Moreover, the coefficient on DFt*Xt3 remains positive (p = 0.0001).24 
 Second, we perform two additional subsample analyses to further ascertain the potential 
impact of self-selection.25 We first limit our sample to firms that forecast in some years but not in 
others (“SMF firms”) and test whether FERCs are greater in years where SMF firms issue 
forecasts than in years where SMF firms do not issue forecasts.26 This test requires a sufficiently 
long period to allow for both forecasting and non-forecasting years, so our sample consists of 
1,723 unique firms with at least four years of data (number of firm-years = 9,085; 4,690 with 
forecasts and 4,395 without). The results in Column 1 of Table 3, Panel B are similar to those 
previously reported; FERCs are greater when SMF firms issue forecasts. 
                                                 
23 We add these variables and their interactions with Xt3 to model (3), and find that the coefficient on INSTt*Xt3 is 
marginally significant (p = 0.0457) but the coefficients on BDINDt*Xt3 and D_CAPt*Xt3 are not significant. When 
the other control variables (SIZE, LOSS, GROWTH, EARNSTD, and NANAL) and their interactions with Xt3 are 
included (as in model (4)), INSTt*Xt3, BDINDt*Xt3, and D_CAPt*Xt3 are all insignificant. 
24 Results from the Heckman two-stage approach for all other analyses using the full sample are robust. For 
parsimony, we report only OLS results in subsequent tables.  
25 We thank the reviewer for suggesting this approach.  
26 This test limits the sample to firms that forecast at least once so it provides some control for self-selection. 
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 Next, we limit the sample to SMF firms and non-forecasting firms (“NMF firms”) and 
compare FERCs of SMF firms in non-forecasting years to FERCs of NMF firms. In Column 2 of 
Table 3, Panel B, DSMF is an indicator set to one when a SMF firm does not forecast earnings in 
the year, and zero otherwise. The coefficient on DSMFt*Xt3 is not significant. Thus, the FERCs 
of SMF firms are not greater than the FERCs of NMF firms in years when SMF firms do not 
issue forecasts. Taken together, these analyses reveal that FERCs are not different for SMF 
versus NMF firms when SMF firms do not issue forecasts. However, FERCs are greater when 
SMF firms issue forecasts. Thus, these results alleviate self-selection concerns.   
4.3 The effect of forecast frequency on the FERC (H2) 
 H2a predicts that FERCs increase with forecast frequency. To test this, we replace DF 
with LNF (the natural log of one plus the number of forecasts issued in the year) in Table 4. The 
coefficient on LNFt*Xt3 is positive [p = 0.0001 in Column 1 (full sample); p = 0.0001 in Column 
2 (restricted sample)] and the results qualitatively unchanged using the Heckman two-stage 
approach in the full sample (untabulated). Thus, FERCs increase with forecast frequency 
suggesting that the issuance of multiple forecasts in a period enhances the market‟s ability to 
bring future earnings news into current stock prices.27  
[Insert table 4 about here] 
4.4 The effect of forecast precision on the FERC (H3) 
 We also test whether FERCs increase with forecast precision (see H3a) in Table 4, 
Column 3.28  In Column 3, the coefficient on PRECt*Xt3 is positive (p = 0.0253) and the 
                                                 
27 In contrast, the coefficient on LNFt*Xt is not significant for the full sample, suggesting that, on average, how 
investors respond to current earnings (the ERC) is not influenced by management forecast frequency. However, 
when we limit our analyses to the restricted sample (Columns 2, 3, and 4), the coefficient on LNFt*Xt is negative. 
The negative coefficients on LNFt*Xt and positive coefficients on LNFt*Xt3 suggest that investors focus more on 
forecasted future earnings than on current earnings in setting stock prices as forecast frequency increases. 
28 The results are qualitatively similar when we do not control for the number of forecasts issued (LNF). 
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coefficient on LNFt*Xt3 remains positive. Thus, providing frequent, precise forecasts enhances 
the ability of current returns to reflect future earning news.  
Since frequency and precision are endogenous given the decision to forecast, we also 
employ 2SLS on the restricted sample. We follow Ajinkya et al. (2005) and include variables 
similar to those in the Heckman first-stage model and estimate fitted values of LNF and PREC in 
the first-stage regressions (see the Appendix). Columns 4 and 5 present the second-stage 
estimations which are largely consistent with the previous results; the coefficients on LNFt*Xt3 
and PRECt*Xt3 remain positive.29   
4.5 The effect of forecast type (annual vs. quarterly) on the FERC (H4) 
Since recommendations to reduce earnings guidance focus on eliminating quarterly 
forecasts, by implication, annual forecasts are assumed to be beneficial and quarterly forecasts 
are assumed to be detrimental.  To investigate the effect of forecast type on FERCs, we estimate 
the following model in Table 5, Panel A: 
 Rt = b0 + b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3 + c1 Fti + c2 Fti*Xt-1 + c3 Fti*Xt + c4 Fti*Xt3  
+ c5 Fti*Rt3 + f1 SIZEt  + f2 SIZEt*Xt3 + f3 LOSSt + f4 LOSSt*Xt3 + f5 GROWTHt   
+ f6 GROWTHt*Xt3 + f7 EARNSTDt + f8 EARNSTDt*Xt3  + f9 NANALt   
+ f10 NANALt*Xt3 + εt        (6) 
 
 where: 
  
in Column 1, Fti  = DAFt = 1 if annual forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 
otherwise; 
 
in Column 2, Fti  = DQFt = 1 if quarterly forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 
otherwise; 
 
in Column 3, Fti  = DAFt_ONLY, DQFt_ONLY, and DQAt_JOINT; and 
 
 all other variables are as previously defined. 
  
                                                 
29 Using two fitted variables in the same second-stage regression does not cause econometric problems even if the 
two fitted variables are estimated using similar variables in the first-stage regression (Gul et al. 2009). In addition, 
the Pearson correlation between the fitted values of LNF and PREC is only 0.1684. 
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[Insert table 5 about here] 
Column 1 of Table 5, Panel A supports H4(i)a. The coefficient on DAFt*Xt3 is positive (p 
= 0.0001), confirming that returns reflect future earnings to a greater extent when managers 
forecast annual EPS. More importantly, Column 2 supports H4(ii)a. The coefficient on DQFt*Xt3 
is positive (p = 0.0001), confirming that returns reflect future earnings to a greater extent even 
when managers forecast quarterly EPS. Thus, even quarterly forecasts appear to provide 
information about future earnings news, allowing this to be reflected in stock prices.  
Since some firms making quarterly forecasts also make annual forecasts, we perform two 
additional tests. First, in untabulated analyses, we add an indicator for quarterly-only forecasts 
(DQF_ONLY) and appropriate interaction terms in Column 2. The coefficient on 
DQFt_ONLY*Xt3 is positive (p = 0.0023). Second, in Column 3, we form separate indicator 
variables for quarterly-only forecasts (DQF_ONLY), annual-only forecasts (DAF_ONLY), and 
both quarterly and annual forecasts (DQA_JOINT). Again, the coefficient on DQFt_ONLY*Xt3 is 
positive (p = 0.0001). These two tests confirm that returns reflect future earnings to a greater 
extent even when managers issue only quarterly forecasts. A test of equality cannot reject that 
the coefficient estimate on DQF_ONLY*Xt3 equals that on DAF_ONLY*Xt3 (F-value = 0.31, p = 
0.5777), suggesting that quarterly EPS forecasts may be as informative as annual EPS forecasts 
with respect to future earnings.   
In Column 4 (restricted sample) results suggest that issuing both quarterly and annual 
EPS forecasts provides more information than issuing either quarterly- or annual-only forecasts 
(p = 0.0001). Finally, because the decision to issue both quarterly and annual forecasts could be 
endogenous, we use 2SLS on the restricted sample in Column 5. Again, our inferences remain 
unchanged.   
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 In Panel B, we test the effect of issuing quarterly-only forecasts relative to not forecasting 
(H4(ii)). Here, FERCs are greater when managers issue quarterly-only forecasts (Column 1: p = 
0.0001) and when quarterly-only forecasts are more frequent (Column 2: p = 0.0001). Using a 
restricted sample of firms issuing quarterly-only forecasts, we confirm our findings for H2a and 
H3a: FERCs are greater when managers issue more quarterly-only forecasts (Column 3: p = 
0.0001 and Column 4: p = 0.0003) and when quarterly-only forecasts are more precise (Column 
4: p = 0.0322). The results are qualitatively unchanged using 2SLS (Columns 5 and 6). 
 Since some of the quarterly forecasts in our sample are of long-term earnings, we 
perform more conservative analyses by limiting our restricted sample to short-term, quarterly-
only forecasts (n = 2,265); here, we eliminate 70 observations with forecasts for quarters in 
future fiscal years (i.e., long-term, quarterly forecasts). Untabulated results reveal that FERCs are 
greater for firms issuing short-term, quarterly-only forecasts (p = 0.0001) than for those not 
issuing forecasts (H4(iii)), and when short-term, quarterly-only forecasts are more frequent (p = 
0.0001). Moreover, within the restricted sample, FERCs are greater when managers issue more 
frequent short-term, quarterly-only forecasts (p = 0.0002) and when short-term, quarterly-only 
forecasts are more precise (p = 0.0315). Untabulated results using 2SLS are similar (n = 1,942). 
Thus, these results suggest that even short-term, quarterly-only forecasts allow investors to adjust 
stock prices so that returns reflect future earnings surprises. 
4.6 The effect of forecast horizon (long- vs. short-term) on the FERC (H5) 
Finally, in Table 6, we perform tests using forecast horizon because concerns expressed 
by the Chamber of Commerce and others may be directed at short-term quarterly guidance. We 
estimate the following model: 
 Rt = b0 + b1 Xt-1 + b2 Xt + b3 Xt3 + b4 Rt3 + c1 Fti + c2 Fti*Xt-1 + c3 Fti*Xt + c4 Fti*Xt3  
+ c5 Fti*Rt3 + f1 SIZEt  + f2 SIZEt*Xt3 + f3 LOSSt + f4 LOSSt*Xt3 + f5 GROWTHt   
 
 
28 
+ f6 GROWTHt*Xt3 + f7 EARNSTDt  + f8 EARNSTDt*Xt3  + f9 NANALt   
+ f10 NANALt*Xt3 + εt        (7) 
 
 where: 
  
in Column 1, Fti  = DLFt = 1 if a forecast for a future fiscal year (or quarter in a future 
fiscal year) is issued during the fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
 
in Column 2, Fti  = DCFt = 1 if a forecast for the current fiscal year (or quarter in the 
current fiscal year) is issued during the fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
 
in Column 3, Fti  = DCFt_ONLY, DLFt_ONLY, and DCLt_JOINT, where DCFt_ONLY , = 
1 if only a forecast for the current fiscal year (or quarters in the current fiscal year) is 
issued during the fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; DLFt_ONLY, = 1 if only a forecast for a 
future fiscal year (or quarter in a future fiscal year) is issued during the fiscal year t, 0 
otherwise; DCLt_JOINT = 1 if both a forecast for the current fiscal year (or quarters in 
the current fiscal year) and a forecast for a future fiscal year (or a quarter in a future fiscal 
year) are issued during the fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise; and 
 
 all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
Column 1 of Table 6 supports H5(i)a. The coefficient on DLFt*Xt3 is positive (p = 
0.0001), confirming that returns reflect future earnings to a greater extent when managers issue 
long-term forecasts. Moreover, in Column 2, the coefficient on DCFt*Xt3 is positive (p = 0.0001) 
confirming that returns reflect future earnings to a greater extent when managers issue short-term 
forecasts.  
Since some firms make short- and long-term forecasts, we perform three additional tests. 
First, we add DCF_ONLY and appropriate interaction terms in Column 2 (untabulated); the 
coefficient on DCFt_ONLY*Xt3 is positive (p = 0.0001). Second, in Column 3, we form 
DCF_ONLY, DLF_ONLY, and DCL_JOINT. Again, the coefficient on DCFt_ONLY*Xt3 is 
positive (p = 0.0001). Third, we compare FERCs of firms issuing short-term-only forecasts and 
those of firms issuing no forecasts, after we eliminate 1,620 observations making any long-term 
forecasts from the full sample (untabulated). Here, we continue to find that the coefficient on 
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DCFt_ONLY*Xt3 is positive (p = 0.0001). These tests confirm that returns reflect future earnings 
to a greater extent even when managers issue only short-term EPS forecasts, supporting H5(ii)a. 
When we separate Xt3 into Xt+1, X t+2, and Xt+3 in Column 3 of Table 6, the coefficients on 
DCF_ONLYt*Xt+1 and DCF_ONLYt*Xt+2 are positive (p = 0.0001 and 0.0001, respectively) but 
the coefficient on DCF_ONLYt*Xt+3 (p = 0.2690) is not significant. This suggests that short-term 
forecasts are more informative about near-term future earnings. However, the coefficient on 
DLF_ONLYt*Xt+2 is marginally significant (p = 0.0611) but the coefficients on the other two 
interactions with DLF_ONLYt (i. e., DLF_ONLYt*Xt+1 and DLF_ONLYt*Xt+3) are not 
significant.30 Finally, Columns 4 (OLS results) and 5 (2SLS results) suggest that issuing both 
short and long-term forecasts provides more information than issuing either only short-term or 
long-term forecasts.   
 Finally, we perform additional analyses regarding the effect of the number and precision 
of forecasts within a restricted sample of short-term-only forecasts (n = 5,733) by eliminating 
1,620 observations with any long-term forecasts from the previous restricted sample. 
Untabulated results reveal that FERCs are greater when managers issue more frequent short-
term-only forecasts (p = 0.0001) and when short-term-only forecasts are more precise (p = 
0.0155). Untabulated results using 2SLS are similar (n = 4,978). Thus, our inferences regarding 
H2a and H3a do not change when we consider the number and precision of short-term-only 
forecasts.  
                                                 
30 This lack of significance may be due to low power resulting from a small number of observations with only long-
term forecasts. Among our 7,353 restricted sample observations, 131 issue long-term-only forecasts while 5,733 
(1,489) observations issued short-term-only forecasts (both short- and long-term forecasts). Another possibility is 
that long-term forecasts are perceived as less credible when short-term forecasts are not provided. 
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4.7 Other robustness checks 
We perform additional sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of our results. First, in 
our main analyses, we interact our control variables with X t3 and with the intercept following 
Orpurt and Zang (2009) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006). Other studies (e.g., Ettredge et al. 
2005) interact each of the control variables with all Xts and with Rt3. Untabulated results remain 
unchanged when we add these interactions. 
Second, since the percentage of firms issuing forecasts and forecast characteristics can 
vary over time and industry, the effects of industry and year could bias our results. To address 
this, following Tucker and Zarowin (2006), we convert all continuous control variables (i.e., 
SIZE, GROWTH, EARNSTD, NANAL) into fractional rankings within their (two-digit SIC code) 
industry-years. Untabulated results remain unchanged. Next, we include year and industry 
indicators in the first-stage Heckman model and 2SLS regressions and we alternatively include 
year and industry indicators in the pooled OLS and all second-stage regressions. Again, our 
untabulated results remain unchanged.  
Lastly, we conduct Fama-MacBeth (1973)-type tests on our main OLS regressions by 
first running annual regressions and estimating coefficients, and then calculating the mean and t-
statistics over time. Although there are only six years in our sample period, our main results 
remain robust.  
 
5 Conclusion 
In this study, we examine whether management EPS forecasts and their characteristics 
are associated with the ability of returns to reflect future earning news. We posit that information 
in these forecasts will affect the association between returns and future earnings if the forecasts 
are more accurate than are extant expectations and if investors view these forecasts as credible. 
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Moreover, we posit that forecast characteristics should be important in revising investor 
expectations since more frequent, more precise, and longer-term (or more timely) forecasts may 
increase credibility and allow investors to form more accurate expectations of future earnings.  
Our analyses reveal that FERCs are greater for firms issuing (1) forecasts, (2) more 
frequent forecasts, and (3) more precise forecasts. FERCs are also greater for firms issuing 
annual or quarterly forecasts, even when the forecast horizon is short. In addition, FERCs are 
greater for firms issuing short-term forecasts than for non-forecasting firms even when they 
forecast only quarterly EPS (i.e., when they provide short-tem “earnings guidance”). Finally, 
FERCs are greater for firms issuing both long- and short-term forecasts than for firms that issue 
only short-term forecasts or no forecasts. 
Our findings have implications for managers, investors, and regulators by confirming that 
managers can influence investors‟ ability to predict future earnings by providing forecasts that 
are longer-term, more frequent, and more precise. This is especially important in situations 
where managers want to decrease information asymmetry and mispricing of their firms‟ stocks. 
While recent calls for the elimination of quarterly earnings guidance suggest that this guidance 
has detrimental effects, our findings indicate that even short-term, quarterly EPS forecasts help 
investors to form better expectations about future earnings. To the extent that regulators believe 
that investors‟ ability to anticipate future earnings is valuable for efficient resource allocation, 
this study implies that the discontinuation of quarterly guidance will be harmful in this regard.  
We acknowledge some limitations of this study. First, while the issuance and 
characteristics of management forecasts are endogenous in our models, we cannot be sure that 
we have controlled for all sources of endogeneity. Second, our analyses focus on the benefits of 
earnings guidance and we do not provide a measurement of the associated costs. Anecdotal 
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evidence suggests that these costs can include increased pressure to manage earnings to meet 
earnings forecasts, as well as costs of preparing and revising these forecasts, and neglect of long-
term growth opportunities. Since we do not measure net benefits of quarterly guidance, we make 
no assertions from our study as to whether the continuation of quarterly guidance is socially 
beneficial. We hope that future research can shed light on this issue.  
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Appendix 
 
First-stage Models for Heckman Self-Selection and 2SLS Models 
 
Following prior studies (e.g., Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chen at al. 2008; Karamanou and 
Vefeas 2005), we model management‟s decision to issue EPS forecasts using the following 
probit model:  
DFt = d0 + d1 INSTt + d2 BDINDt + d3 D_CAPt + d4 DISPt + d5 BETAt  
+ d6 LITt  + d7 ROAt + d8 SIZEt  + d9 LOSSt  + d10 GROWTHt + d11 EARNSTDt   
+ d12 NANALt + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εt                   (8) 
 
where for year t, all variables are previously defined. 
 
We add a number of variables to the model based on prior literature. Ajinkya et al. (2005) and 
Karamanou and Vefeas (2005) find that institutional ownership (INSTt) and board independence 
(BDINDt) are positively associated with the likelihood of management forecasts.31 Frankel et al. 
(1995) find that firms raising significant amounts of external capital (D_CAPt) voluntarily 
disclose more information. Ajinkya and Gift (1984) and Miller (2005) find that firms with 
greater analyst following (NANALt) and greater information asymmetry (DISPt and EARNSTDt) 
are more likely to issue voluntary disclosures. Alternatively, DISPt and EARNSTDt can proxy for 
uncertainties or difficulties that managers face in generating EPS forecasts. Skinner (1994) finds 
that firms in high litigation risk industries (LITt) are more likely to voluntarily disclose bad news. 
Miller (2002) finds that contemporaneous firm performance ROAt and LOSSt affect voluntary 
disclosure. Equity beta (BETA), the log of total assets (SIZEt), and growth in total assts 
(GROWTHt) control for market risk, size, and firm growth respectively. Finally, we include year 
                                                 
31 We obtain board independence (BDINDt) data from the Board Analytics and Investor Responsibility Research 
Center (IRRC) databases. This data item is missing for 4,973 of 13,420 sample observations. Due to a large number 
of missing data observations, we use the „modified zero-order regression‟ method suggested by Maddala (1977) and 
Greene (2003) which substitutes a zero for missing values and adds an indicator variable coded one if the 
corresponding variable is missing. That is, we set BDINDt to zero if it is missing and set MISSINGt to one if BDINDt 
is set to zero because it is missing, and we set MISSINGt to zero if BDINDt is not missing. Our main results are 
qualitatively unchanged if we exclude observations missing data, but we tabulate the results with modified zero-
order regressions because this method requires fewer assumptions about the missing values. 
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and (two-digit SIC code) industry indicators to control for differences in EPS forecasts over time 
and across industries.  
 Once a manager decides to issue a forecast, frequency, precision, and whether to issue 
both annual and quarterly forecasts (or whether to issue both short- and long-term forecasts) may 
be endogenous.32 Thus, we employ 2SLS using the following first-stage regressions:  
LNFt, DQA_JOINTt or DCL_JOINTt = d0 + d1 INSTt + d2 BDINDt + d3 D_CAPt  
+ d4 DISPt + d5 BETAt + d6 LITt  + d7 ROAt + d8 SIZEt  + d9 LOSSt  + d10 GROWTHt  
+ d11 EARNSTDt  + d12 NANALt + d13 Xt-1 + d14 Xt + d15 Xt3 + d16 Rt3  
+ Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εt      (9) 
 
PRECt  = d0 + d1 INSTt + d2 BDINDt + d3 D_CAPt + d4 DISPt + d5 BETAt + d6 LITt   
+ d7 ROAt + d8 SIZEt  + d9 LOSSt  + d10 GROWTHt + d11 EARNSTDt  + d12 NANALt  
+ d13 HORIZONt + d14 Xt-1 + d15 Xt + d16 Xt3 + d17 Rt3 
 + Year Dummies + Industry Dummies + εt      (10) 
 
 where for year t:   
HORIZONt   = the average forecast horizon (i.e., the number of days between the 
forecast dates and the fiscal period-end dates) in fiscal year t; and 
 
all other variables are as previously defined. 
 
For the forecast frequency (LNFt) and precisions (PRECt) models, we include all independent 
variables used in the Heckman first-stage model. We add average forecast horizon (HORIZONt) 
to the precision model, following the forecast frequency and specificity models in Ajinkya et al. 
(2005, 356). Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that institutional ownership (INSTt) and/or board 
independence (BDINDt) are positively associated with management forecast frequency and 
precision. We also include all of the variables used in the second-stage equation as suggested by 
Larcker and Rusticus (2008). 
                                                 
32 When we perform the Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity for each model in our restricted samples, we find that 
endogeneity is significant only when both forecast frequency and precision are jointly included in the model (as in 
Column 3 in Table 4 (p = 0.0251)). Although we find endogeneity for only this specification of the models, in order 
to enhance comparability, we employ 2SLS procedures for all restricted sample models.  
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The results of the first-stage estimation, provided in Exhibit 1, are largely consistent with 
prior studies. Importantly, institutional ownership (INSTt), board independence (BDINDt), and an 
indicator variable for external financing (D_CAPt) are positively associated with the dependent 
variables in most regressions. We also find that the partial F-statistics for the instruments used in 
the first-stage 2SLS models are more significant than the benchmarks in Stock et al. (2002), 
which suggests that these models are unlikely to be subject to weak instrument problems. 
[Insert Exhibit 1 about here] 
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EXHIBIT 1 
First-stage Models for Heckman and Two-stage Least-squares (2SLS) Estimation 
Variable 
First-stage of 
Heckman 
Full Sample  
(n=13,420) 
First-stage of 2SLS 
Restricted Sample  
(n=6,482)  
Column 1 
Dep. Var. = 
DFt  
Column 2 
Dep. Var. = 
LNFt  
Column 3 
Dep. Var. = 
PRECt 
Column 4 
Dep. Var. = 
DQA_JOINTt  
Column 5 
Dep. Var. = 
DCL_JOINTt  
Intercept -0.9174
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.7259*** 
(.0001) 
 2.7428*** 
(.0035) 
 0.2273** 
(.0201) 
 0.0869 
(.2821) 
INSTt  0.3925
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1553*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1489*** 
(.0061) 
 0.1455*** 
(.0013) 
 0.0957*** 
(.0007) 
BDINDt  0.5215
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0659** 
(.0311) 
 0.1209** 
(.0411) 
 0.0046* 
(.0899) 
 0.0133* 
(.0516) 
D_CAPt  0.0266
*** 
(.0014) 
 0.0374*** 
(.0073) 
 0.0194** 
(.0342) 
 0.0232** 
(.0258) 
 0.0573*** 
(.0001) 
DISPt -0.3382
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0787* 
(.0521) 
-0.1388** 
(.0172) 
 0.0114 
(.7549) 
-0.0126 
(.6782) 
BETAt -0.0228 (.3749) 
-0.0638*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0451** 
(.0350) 
-0.0640*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0692*** 
(.0001) 
LITt -0.0189 (.6851) 
 0.1169*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0166 
(.6466) 
 0.0529** 
(.0200) 
 0.0359** 
(.0485) 
ROAt  0.4833
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1174*** 
(.1354) 
 0.0258 
(.8192) 
-0.0277 
(.6958) 
-0.0876 
(.1347) 
SIZEt -0.0111 (.3130) 
 0.0564*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0388*** 
(.0005) 
 0.0266*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0166*** 
(.0015) 
LOSSt -0.0528 (.1288) 
 0.0028 
(.8962) 
-0.1151*** 
(.0002) 
-0.0235 
(.2250) 
 0.0244 
(.1285) 
GROWTHt -0.0012
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0001 
(.2026) 
 0.0002 
(.2065) 
 0.0001 
(.2272) 
 0.0002*** 
(.0030) 
EARNSTDt  0.5621
*** 
(.0043) 
 0.1857 
(.1304) 
-0.4598*** 
(.0092) 
-0.1335 
(.2288) 
 0.0471 
(.6076) 
NANALt  0.4238
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0612*** 
(.0005) 
 0.0763*** 
(.0025) 
 0.0246** 
(.0198) 
 0.0363*** 
(.0056) 
HORIZONt   0.0007
*** 
(.0001)   
Xt-1   0.1799
*** 
(.0077) 
 0.0770 
(.4274) 
 0.0525 
(.3891) 
 0.0304 
(.5470) 
Xt   0.3111
*** 
(.0045) 
-0.1438 
(.3608) 
 0.2698*** 
(.0064) 
 0.2911*** 
(.0004) 
Xt3   0.0237 (.4542) 
 0.0739 
(.1047) 
-0.0438 
(.1261) 
 0.0693*** 
(.0034) 
Rt3   0.0009 (.8844) 
-0.0091 
(.3246) 
 0.0091* 
(.0973) 
-0.0031 
(.5207) 
Year & Industry  
Dummies Included  Included Included Included Included 
Likelihood  
Ratio Score  
(Pr > χ2) 
2,759.47 
(.0001)     
Adjusted R2  0.2406 0.1056 0.1355 0.1407 
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The first-stage Heckman model is estimated using a probit regression and the first-stage 2SLS models are estimated 
using OLS regressions. When estimating the coefficient standard errors, we use White‟s (1980) method to correct 
for heteroskedasticity as well as a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given 
firm (Petersen 2009).  
 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote p-values < 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. Continuous variables with values falling into the extreme top and bottom percentiles of their respective 
distributions are winsorized. The sample size is reduced (for the full sample from 18,253 to 13,420 observations and 
for the restricted sample from 7,353 to 6,482 observations) due to additional data requirements. 
 
INSTt = the percentage of institutional ownership at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
BDINDt  = the percentage of board independence at the beginning of fiscal year t; as in the prior research, 
independent directors refer to those who are not corporate executives and have no business relationship 
with the firm; 
D_CAPt = 1 if the sum of debt or equity issued during the year t is greater than 5% of total assets, and 0 
otherwise;  
DISPt  = analyst forecast dispersion in year t, measured as the standard deviation of one-year-ahead EPS 
forecasts, scaled by the absolute mean forecast; we use the most recent consensus forecast before the 
end of year t; 
BETAt  = equity beta for fiscal year t; 
LITt = 1 for firms in high litigation risk industries (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 
5200-5961, 8731-8734), and 0 otherwise; 
ROAt  = return on assets for fiscal year t; and 
HORIZONt  = the average forecast horizon (i.e., the number of days between the forecast dates and the fiscal period-
end dates) in fiscal year t; 
DCLt_JOINT = 1 if a (quarterly or annual) short-term forecast and a (quarterly or annual) long-term forecast are 
issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; and  
all other variables as defined in Table 2, Panel A.  
 
46 
 
Table 1 
Sample description 
 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Full Sample Restricted Sample 
# of obs. Avg. # of forecasts # of obs. 
Avg. # of 
forecasts 
Avg. forecast 
precision 
1998 3,014 0.621 881 2.125 2.816 
1999 3,002 0.741 961 2.314 2.595 
2000 3,179 0.960 1,145 2.667 2.666 
2001 3,181 1.982 1,553 4.060 2.934 
2002 3,170 2.330 1,492 4.951 3.022 
2003 2,707 2.559 1,321 5.243 3.002 
Total 18,253 1.521 7,353 3.776 2.885 
 
The restricted sample consists of observations with at least one management forecast made during the fiscal year. 
Forecast precision refers to whether the management forecast is a point estimate of expected earnings (e.g., we 
expect EPS to be $1.02), a range of expected earnings (e.g., we expect EPS to be between $0.95 and $1.05), a 
maximum level of expected earnings (e.g., EPS will be below $1.10), a minimum level of expected earnings (e.g., 
EPS will be at least $0.93), or a qualitative statement about earnings (e.g., we expect a good year. We are OK with 
expected earnings). To calculate the average forecast precision for an observation, we use an ordinal coding scheme 
for each forecast that gives the highest values to the most precise forecasts: point, range, minimum / maximum, and 
qualitative forecasts are coded 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively, following the classifications in the Appendix of 
Anilowski et al. (2007).  The average forecast specificity for each firm-year in the restricted sample is calculated as 
[(4 x the number of point forecasts) + (3 x the number of range forecasts) + (2 x the number of minimum / 
maximum forecasts) + (1 x the number of qualitative forecasts)] / (the number of forecasts issued during the fiscal 
year).  
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Number of firm-years with quarterly and annual forecasts in the restricted sample 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Quarterly 
Forecasts only 
Annual  
Forecasts only 
Both Quarterly 
and Annual 
Forecasts 
Total 
1998 386 219 276 881 
1999 366 295 300 961 
2000 438 244 463 1,145 
2001 483 316 754 1,553 
2002 387 385 720 1,492 
2003 275 421 625 1,321 
Total 2,335 1,880 3,138 7,353 
 
The restricted sample firm-years (n =7,353) consist of observations (n = 2,335) that issued only quarterly forecasts, 
observations (n = 1,880) that issued only annual forecasts, and observations (n = 3,138) that issued both quarterly 
and annual forecasts.   
 
Panel C: Precision of individual forecasts 
 
 Point forecasts 
Range 
forecasts 
Min/max 
forecasts 
Qualitative 
forecasts Total 
Number of annual forecasts 2,973 8,924 847 1,003 13,747 
Number of quarterly forecasts 3,172 8,410 1,230 1,208 14,020 
Number of total forecasts 6,145 17,334 2,077 2,211 27,767 
 
The restricted sample (n = 7,353) issued a total of 27,767 EPS forecasts (13,747 annual forecasts and 14,020 
quarterly forecasts). This table presents precision of individual forecasts.   
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Full sample (n = 18,253)      
DFt 0.4028 0.4905 0 0 0 1 1 
DQF_ONLYt 0.1279 0.3340 0 0 0 0 1 
DAF_ONLYt 0.1030 0.3040 0 0 0 0 1 
DQA_JOINTt 0.1719 0.3773 0 0 0 0 1 
LNFt 0.5497 0.7708 0 0 0 1.0986 2.1972 
Rt 0.1437 0.7658 -0.6899 -0.2713 0.0197 0.3512 1.3315 
Xt-1 0.0091 0.1505 -0.2112 0.0039 0.0426 0.0705 0.1225 
X t 0.0164 0.1234 -0.2194 -0.0031 0.0456 0.0768 0.1393 
X t3 0.1160 0.3615 -0.5136 -0.0222 0.1520 0.2853 0.6287 
R t3 0.5906 1.5738 -0.7710 -0.1835 0.3140 0.9126 2.7574 
SIZE t 6.3111 1.8683 3.5385 4.9308 6.1802 7.4646 9.6588 
LOSSt 0.2621 0.4398 0 0 0 1 1 
GROWTH t 39.7413 133.4308 -34.9366 -0.8619 17.9210 46.4463 165.7805 
EARNSTD t 0.0647 0.0752 0.0065 0.0174 0.0371 0.0811 0.2233 
NANAL t 1.5382 0.8627 0 0.6931 1.6094 2.1972 2.9444 
Restricted sample (n = 7,353)      
DQF_ONLYt 0.3176 0.4656 0 0 0 1 1 
DAF_ONLYt 0.2557 0.4363 0 0 0 1 1 
DQA_JOINTt 0.4268 0.4946 0 0 0 1 1 
LNFt 1.3645 0.6026 0.6931 0.6931 1.3863 1.7918 2.4849 
PRECt 2.8848 0.7835 1 2 3 3.25 4 
DFt  = 1 if a management earnings per share (EPS) forecast is issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DQF_ONLYt = 1 if only quarterly management EPS forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DAF_ONLYt  = 1 if only annual management EPS forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DQA_JOINTt= 1 if both quarterly and annual management EPS forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
LNFt = the natural log of (one plus the number of management EPS forecasts issued during fiscal year t); 
Rt  = the cumulative (monthly compounded) return for fiscal year t; 
Xt-1  = income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items in fiscal year t-1 deflated by 
the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
X t = income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items deflated by the market value of 
equity at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
X t3 = the sum of income available to common shareholders before extraordinary items for years t+1 
through t+3 deflated by the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
Rt3  = the cumulative return for fiscal years t+1 to t+3; 
SIZEt  = the natural log of the market value of equity at the beginning of fiscal year t; 
LOSSt  = 1 if Xt3 is negative, 0 otherwise; 
GROWTHt  = the percentage growth in total assets from year t-1 to year t+1; 
EARNSTDt  = the standard deviation of X for year t through t+3; 
NANALt  = the natural log of (one plus the number of analysts following the firm in the month prior to the 
earnings announcement for fiscal year t), from the First Call Analyst Forecast database; and 
PRECt  = the average forecast precision of management EPS forecasts in fiscal year t, calculated by awarding 
a score of 4  to all point forecasts, 3 to all range forecasts, 2 to all minimum / maximum forecasts, and 
1 to all qualitative forecasts, and calculating the average score for the firm-year observation.
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlations (full sample) 
 
Variable DFt LNFt Rt Xt-1 Xt Xt3 R t3 SIZEt LOSSt GROWTHt EARNSTDt 
LNFt 0.868 
(<0.001) 
          
Rt -0.043 
(<0.001) 
-0.023 
(<0.001) 
         
Xt-1 0.077 
(<0.001) 
0.080 
(<0.001) 
-0.073 
(<0.001) 
        
Xt 0.059 
(<0.001) 
0.073 
(<0.001) 
0.147 
(<0.001) 
0.547 
(<0.001) 
       
Xt3 0.056 
(<0.001) 
0.078 
(<0.001) 
0.102 
(<0.001) 
0.315 
(<0.001) 
0.504 
(<0.001) 
      
R t3 -0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.058) 
-0.148 
(<0.001) 
-0.059 
(<0.001) 
-0.061 
(<0.001) 
0.293 
(<0.001) 
     
SIZEt 0.249 
(<0.001) 
0.291 
(<0.001) 
-0.106 
(<0.001) 
0.176 
(<0.001) 
0.142 
(<0.001) 
0.090 
(<0.001) 
-0.130 
(<0.001) 
    
LOSSt -0.067 
(<0.001) 
-0.090 
(<0.001) 
-0.151 
(<0.001) 
-0.319 
(<0.001) 
-0.495 
(<0.001) 
-0.587 
(<0.001) 
-0.070 
(<0.001) 
-0.169 
(<0.001) 
   
GROWTHt -0.038 
(<0.001) 
-0.038 
(<0.001) 
0.233 
(<0.001) 
-0.034 
(<0.001) 
0.066 
(<0.001) 
-0.038 
(<0.001) 
-0.066 
(<0.001) 
0.009 
(0.239) 
0.015 
(0.038) 
  
EARNSTDt -0.064 
(<0.001)  
-0.083 
(<0.001) 
0.172 
(<0.001) 
-0.352 
(<0.001) 
-0.429 
(<0.001) 
-0.209 
(<0.001) 
0.150 
(<0.001) 
-0.304 
(<0.001) 
0.270 
(<0.001) 
0.071 
(<0.001) 
 
NANALt 0.344 
(<0.001) 
0.373 
(<0.001) 
0.059 
(<0.001) 
0.119 
(<0.001) 
0.136 
(<0.001) 
0.092 
(<0.001) 
-0.133 
(<0.001) 
0.700 
(<0.001) 
-0.147 
(<0.001) 
0.070 
(<0.001) 
-0.185 
(<0.001) 
 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in parentheses. 
Variable definitions appear in Panel A. 
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Table 3 
Regression analyses on the effect of forecast issuance on the FERC 
 
Panel A: Effect of management forecasts 
Variable 
Full sample  
OLS (n=18,253) 
Heckman 
Two-stage  
(n=13,420) 
Column 1 
Model (2) 
Column 2 
Model (3) 
Column 3 
Model (4) Column 4 
Intercept 0.1562
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.2022*** 
(.0001) 
 0.2281*** 
(.0001) 
 0.9041*** 
(.0001) 
Xt-1 -1.1835
*** 
(.0001) 
-1.0615*** 
(.0001) 
-0.7640*** 
(.0001) 
-1.0915*** 
(.0001) 
Xt  1.2202
*** 
(.0001) 
 1.1921*** 
(.0001) 
 1.2001*** 
(.0001) 
 1.0474*** 
(.0001) 
Xt3  0.2780
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1216*** 
(.0001) 
 0.4016*** 
(.0001) 
 0.7109*** 
(.0001) 
R t3 -0.0915
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0922*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1143*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1760*** 
(.0001) 
DFt  -0.1434
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1085*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1348** 
(.0215) 
DFt * Xt-1  -0.1998 (.2253) 
-0.2750* 
(.0629) 
-0.0331 
(.7543) 
DFt * Xt   0.0880 (.6240) 
 0.1498 
(.3473) 
 0.1321 
(.3406) 
DFt * Xt3   0.5513
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.3712*** 
(.0001) 
 0.2561*** 
(.0001) 
DFt * Rt3  -0.0026 (.8873) 
 0.0093 
(.6756) 
 0.0259 
(.3107) 
Millst    -0.1967
** 
(.0175) 
DFt*Millst      0.1292 (.3046) 
SIZEt   -0.0886
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0984*** 
(.0001) 
SIZEt* Xt3    0.1001
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0920*** 
(.0001) 
LOSSt   -0.2092
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1982*** 
(.0001) 
LOSSt* Xt3   -0.8319
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8760*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt    0.0010
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0026*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt* Xt3    0.0004
*** 
(.0002) 
 0.0009*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt    2.2622
*** 
(.0001) 
 2.3290*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt* Xt3   -0.7933
*** 
(.0021) 
-1.0648*** 
(.0021) 
NANALt    0.1929
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1023*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt* Xt3    0.2789
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.2441*** 
(.0001) 
Adjusted R2 0.0868 0.1021 0.2671 0.3280 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Subsample analyses for self-selection issue 
Variable 
Within SMF firms  
OLS (n=9,085) 
SMF vs. NMF firms  
OLS (n=7,946) 
Column 1 
F1 = DFt 
Column 2 
F1 = DSMFt 
Intercept  0.2741
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1527*** 
(.0001) 
Xt-1 -0.8758
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.7706*** 
(.0001) 
Xt  1.0765
*** 
(.0001) 
 1.0088*** 
(.0001) 
Xt3  0.8746
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.7887*** 
(.0001) 
R t3 -0.1858
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1133*** 
(.0001) 
F1 -0.1407
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0782*** 
(.0001) 
F1* Xt-1 -0.0896 (.4656) 
-0.1587* 
(.0604) 
F1* Xt  0.2360 (.2399) 
 0.0432 
(.8065) 
F1* Xt3  0.2443
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1479 
(.1304) 
F1* Rt3  0.0354 (.2010) 
-0.0681 
(.1102) 
SIZEt -0.0951
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0816*** 
(.0001) 
SIZEt* Xt3  0.0173 (.4264) 
 0.0678*** 
(.0001) 
LOSSt -0.1376
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1658*** 
(.0001) 
LOSSt* Xt3 -0.6816
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8879*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt  0.0023
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0024*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt* Xt3  0.0003
** 
(.0312) 
 0.0003** 
(.0236) 
EARNSTDt  3.2222
*** 
(.0001) 
 2.6126*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt* Xt3 -1.6193
*** 
(.0001) 
-1.1126*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt  0.1647
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1593*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt* Xt3  0.0798
* 
(.0583) 
 0.2680*** 
(.0001) 
Adjusted R2 0.3286 0.2825 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
When estimating the coefficient standard errors, we use White‟s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity as 
well as a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote p-values < 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. In Panel A, the sample size in Heckman model is smaller due to additional data requirements for the 
first-stage regression. In Panel B, DSMFt = 1 if the firm issues management EPS forecasts in other years during our 
sample period but does not issue a forecast in year t, and 0 otherwise. See Table 2, Panel A for definitions of the 
other variables.  
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Table 4 
Regression analyses on the effect of number of forecasts and forecast precision on the FERC 
 
Variable 
Full sample 
OLS (n=18,253) 
Restricted sample  
OLS (n=7,353) 
Restricted sample  
2SLS (n=6,482) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3  Column 4 Column 5  
Intercept  0.2148
*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.0614 
 (.1975) 
 0.0723 
 (.2463) 
-0.1420*** 
 (.0039) 
 0.3295* 
 (.0740) 
Xt-1 -0.7635
*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.5419** 
 (.0392) 
-0.6378** 
 (.0474) 
-0.8815*** 
 (.0060) 
-0.7439** 
 (.0238) 
Xt  1.2547
*** 
 (.0001) 
 1.7524*** 
 (.0001) 
 1.1904*** 
 (.0001) 
 1.1509*** 
 (.0029) 
 1.1763*** 
 (.0001) 
Xt3  0.3931
*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.6791*** 
 (.0039) 
 0.8962*** 
 (.0029) 
 0.9074*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.8763** 
 (.0138) 
Rt3 -0.1016
*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.0045 
 (.6701) 
-0.0819 
 (.1129) 
-0.0670** 
 (.0364) 
-0.0461 
 (.1259) 
LNFt -0.0541
*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.0637*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.0645*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.2837*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.3619*** 
 (.0001) 
LNFt * Xt-1 -0.2409
** 
 (.0324) 
-0.3780** 
 (.0307) 
-0.3938** 
 (.0403) 
-0.1937* 
 (.0721) 
-0.2866* 
 (.0832) 
LNFt * Xt -0.0036  (.9626) 
-0.4090* 
 (.0587) 
-0.4538** 
 (.0393) 
 0.0739 
 (.8086) 
 0.1348 
 (.2253) 
LNFt * Xt3  0.3314
*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.3868*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.3974*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.1712*** 
 (.0028) 
 0.1625** 
 (.0272) 
LNFt * Rt3 -0.0218
** 
 (.0336) 
-0.0993*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.1022*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.0696*** 
 (.0033) 
-0.0908*** 
 (.0008) 
PRECt   -0.0050  (.1980)  
-0.0596 
 (.1197) 
PRECt* Xt-1    0.0444  (.5815)  
-0.1671 
 (.6398) 
PRECt* Xt   -0.1143  (.2451)  
-0.1027 
 (.1838) 
PRECt* Xt3    0.0746
** 
 (.0253)  
 0.0895* 
 (.0501) 
PRECt* Rt3    0.0269  (.2432)  
 0.0372 
 (.5369) 
SIZEt -0.0876
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0861*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0860*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0875*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1065*** 
(.0001) 
SIZEt* Xt3  0.0971
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0079 
(.7286) 
 0.0084 
(.7108) 
 0.0824 
(.2018) 
-0.0724** 
(.0194) 
LOSSt -0.2128
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1632*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1627*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1535*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1786*** 
(.0001) 
LOSSt* Xt3 -0.8309
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.5010*** 
(.0001) 
-0.5018*** 
(.0001) 
-0.4954*** 
(.0001) 
-0.4845*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt  0.0011
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0018*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0018*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0021*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0021*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt* Xt3  0.0004
*** 
(.0002) 
 0.0010** 
(.0431) 
 0.0010** 
(.0390) 
 0.0005* 
(.0652) 
 0.0006 
(.1376) 
EARNSTDt  2.2512
*** 
(.0001) 
 2.6296*** 
(.0001) 
 2.6554*** 
(.0001) 
 2.6038*** 
(.0001) 
 2.4148*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt* Xt3 -0.7715
*** 
(.0027) 
-1.5677*** 
(.0002) 
-1.5930*** 
(.0001) 
-1.7213*** 
(.0002) 
-1.8657*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt  0.1888
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1488*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1488*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1094*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1279*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt* Xt3  0.2799
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0319 
(.4913) 
 0.0334 
(.4714) 
-0.1133 
(.2968) 
-0.0501 
(.4609) 
Adjusted R2 0.2676 0.3490   0.3528 0.3457 0.3646 
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When estimating the coefficient standard errors, we use White‟s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity as 
well as a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote p-values < 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. LNFt and PRECt in 2SLS (Columns 4 and 5) are the fitted values from the first-stage regressions in the 
Appendix. The sample size in 2SLS is smaller due to additional data requirements for the first-stage regressions. See 
Table 2, Panel A for definitions of the other variables.  
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Table 5 
Regression analyses on the effect of forecast type (annual vs. quarterly) on the FERC 
 
Panel A: Effect of annual and quarterly forecasts 
Variable 
Full sample  
OLS (n = 18,253) 
Restricted 
sample 
OLS  (n = 7,353) 
Restricted  
sample 
2SLS  (n = 6,482) 
Column 1 
F1 = DAFt 
 
Column 2 
F1 = DQFt 
  
Column 3 
F1 = DQF_ONLYt 
F2 = DAF_ONLYt 
F3 = DQA_JOINTt 
Column 4 
F1 = DQA_JOINTt 
Column 5 
F1 = DQA_JOINTt 
Intercept 0.2166
*** 
(.0001) 
0.2248*** 
(.0001) 
0.2282*** 
(.0001) 
0.1082** 
(.0135) 
0.0450 
(.3072) 
Xt-1 -0.8524
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.7631*** 
(.0001) 
-0.7620*** 
(.0001) 
-0.9518*** 
(.0001) 
-1.0572*** 
(.0001) 
Xt 1.2658
*** 
(.0001) 
1.2351*** 
(.0001) 
1.2052*** 
(.0001) 
1.4035*** 
(.0001) 
1.1957*** 
(.0001) 
Xt3 0.4078
*** 
(.0001) 
0.4120*** 
(.0001) 
0.4089*** 
(.0001) 
1.0370*** 
(.0001) 
1.0734*** 
(.0001) 
Rt3 -0.1072
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1114*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1145*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0903*** 
(.0001) 
-0.2933*** 
(.0001) 
F1 -0.0650
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1139*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1283*** 
(.0001) 
0.0011 
(.9474) 
0.2275*** 
(.0020) 
F1 * Xt-1 -0.0964 (.3458) 
-0.1139** 
(.0233) 
-0.0919* 
(.0654) 
-0.1915* 
(.0635) 
0.2297 
(.1319) 
F1 * Xt 0.0095 (.9441) 
0.0702 
(.5530) 
0.0863 
(.4827) 
0.0520 
(.4369) 
0.0297 
(.9614) 
F1 * Xt3 0.4333
*** 
(.0001) 
0.4143*** 
(.0001) 
0.2417*** 
(.0001) 
0.2993*** 
(.0001) 
0.1362** 
(.0134) 
F1 * Rt3 -0.0138 (.1025) 
-0.0001 
(.9905) 
0.0250 
(.5249) 
-0.0679*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1135* 
(.0762) 
F2   -0.0672
*** 
(.0168)   
F2 * Xt-1   0.0859 (.5580)   
F2 * Xt   0.3131 (.1208)   
F2 * Xt3   0.2631
** 
(.0011)   
F2 * Rt3   0.0265 (.1633)   
F3   -0.1086
*** 
(.0001)   
F3 * Xt-1   -0.4247
*** 
(.0014)   
F3 * Xt   -0.0478 (.7785)   
F3 * Xt3   0.5655
*** 
(.0001)   
F3 * Rt3   -0.0396 (.1235)   
SIZEt -0.0886
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0893*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0891*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0833*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0828*** 
(.0001) 
SIZEt* Xt3 0.1011
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0999*** 
(.0001) 
0.0992*** 
(.0001) 
0.0065 
(.7766) 
0.0706 
(.2272) 
LOSSt -0.2157
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.2062*** 
(.0001) 
-0.2078*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1591*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1470*** 
(.0001) 
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LOSSt* Xt3 -0.8598
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8562*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8331*** 
(.0001) 
-0.5327*** 
(.0001) 
-0.5219*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt 0.0011
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0011*** 
(.0001) 
0.0011*** 
(.0001) 
0.0018*** 
(.0001) 
0.0019*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt*Xt3 0.0003
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(.0002) 
0.0004*** 
(.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(.0001) 
0.0006*** 
(.0004) 
EARNSTDt 2.2294
*** 
(.0001) 
2.2585*** 
(.0001) 
2.2797*** 
(.0001) 
2.6139*** 
(.0001) 
2.6936*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt*Xt3 -0.7300
*** 
(.0019) 
-0.7695*** 
(.0022) 
-0.7899*** 
(.0065) 
-1.5837*** 
(.0001) 
-1.8745*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt 0.1832
*** 
(.0001) 
0.1923*** 
(.0001) 
0.1938*** 
(.0001) 
0.1546*** 
(.0001) 
0.1356*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt* Xt3 0.2549
*** 
(.0001) 
0.2665*** 
(.0001) 
0.2808*** 
(.0001) 
0.0245 
(.5990) 
-0.0779 
(.2531) 
Adjusted R2 0.2629 0.2671 0.2701 0.3391 0.3420 
 
When estimating the coefficient standard errors, we use White‟s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity as 
well as a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote p-values < 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
The sample size in 2SLS is smaller due to additional data requirements for the first-stage regressions.  
DAFt = 1 if annual management EPS forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DQFt = 1 if quarterly management EPS forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DQA_JOINTt = 1 if both quarterly and annual management EPS forecasts are issued during fiscal year t, 0 
otherwise; and 
DQA_JOINTt in the 2SLS model (Column 5) is the fitted value from the first-stage regression in the Appendix. 
See Table 2, Panel A for definitions of the other variables.  
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Effect of issuance, number, and precision of quarterly forecasts  
 
Variable 
Full sample 2  
OLS (n=13,235) 
 Restricted sample 2  
OLS (n=2,335) 
 Restricted sample 2  
2SLS (n=1,996) 
Column 1 
F1=DQF_ 
ONLYt 
Column 2 
F1 = LNFt 
Column 3 
F1 = LNFt 
Column 4 
F1 = LNFt 
Column 5 
F1 = LNFt 
Column 6 
F1 = LNFt 
Intercept  0.2226
*** 
 (.0045) 
 0.2142*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.0334 
 (.6434) 
 0.0172 
 (.8371) 
-0.0935 
 (.3012) 
 0.9082** 
 (.0127) 
Xt-1 -0.7670
*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.7741*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.7030*** 
 (.0067) 
-0.3955* 
 (.0502) 
-1.0689** 
 (.0271) 
-0.8402** 
 (.0216) 
Xt  1.1903
*** 
 (.0001) 
 1.2157*** 
 (.0001) 
 1.4762*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.7757*** 
 (.0006) 
 0.8303*** 
 (.0035) 
 0.7944*** 
 (.0060) 
Xt3  0.3168
*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.3130*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.2364** 
 (.0264) 
 0.2651** 
 (.0388) 
 0.2618** 
 (.0362) 
 0.2497** 
 (.0318) 
Rt3 -0.1131
*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.1059*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.1033** 
 (.0325) 
-0.0464 
 (.1527) 
-0.0655* 
 (.0657) 
-0.0614 
 (.1133) 
F1 -0.1270
*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.0872*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.1851 
 (.2322) 
 0.1832 
 (.1774) 
 0.3732** 
 (.0301) 
 0.3316** 
 (.0415) 
F1 * Xt-1 -0.3987
** 
 (.0235) 
-0.3534** 
 (.0421) 
-0.4047* 
 (.0754) 
-0.3499* 
 (.0815) 
-0.4876 
 (.9130) 
-0.2591 
 (.1338) 
F1 * Xt  0.1639  (.2905) 
 0.0362 
 (.7990) 
-0.3312 
 (.3092) 
-0.4651 
 (.1609) 
 0.4528 
 (.4171) 
 0.3498 
 (.2913) 
F1 * Xt3  0.3372
*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.3908*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.6807*** 
 (.0001) 
 0.4253*** 
 (.0003) 
 0.4132** 
 (.0296) 
 0.2607** 
 (.0334) 
F1 * Rt3  0.0248  (.1065) 
 -0.0061 
 (.5630) 
-0.2389*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.2439*** 
 (.0001) 
-0.1284*** 
 (.0056) 
-0.1607*** 
 (.0082) 
PRECt    -0.0061  (.6854)  
-0.0040 
 (.2265) 
PRECt * Xt-1     -0.1412  (.2437)  
 -0.0798 
 (.3325) 
PRECt * Xt    -0.1005  (.2569)  
-0.1177 
 (.6581) 
PRECt * Xt3     0.0868
** 
 (.0322)  
 0.0429* 
 (.0842) 
PRECt * Rt3     0.0583  (.3067)  
-0.0308 
 (.4306) 
SIZEt -0.0892
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0886*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1200*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1198*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1328*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1592*** 
(.0001) 
SIZEt* Xt3  0.1227
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1221*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1867*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1852*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1033* 
(.0595) 
 0.1027* 
(.0782) 
LOSSt -0.2153
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.2158*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1218*** 
(.0009) 
-0.1241*** 
(.0008) 
-0.1009** 
(.0113) 
-0.1468*** 
(.0005) 
LOSSt* Xt3 -0.9164
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.9223*** 
(.0001) 
-0.9078*** 
(.0001) 
-0.9048*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8513*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8964*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt  0.0011
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0011*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0029*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0029*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0029*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0029*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt* Xt3  0.0005
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0005*** 
(.0001) 
 0.0020*** 
(.0005) 
 0.0020*** 
(.0004) 
 0.0019** 
(.0216) 
 0.0018** 
(.0327) 
EARNSTDt  2.1082
*** 
(.0001) 
 2.0888*** 
(.0001) 
 2.2754*** 
(.0001) 
 2.3154*** 
(.0001) 
 2.3294*** 
(.0001) 
 2.0622*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt* Xt3 -0.5990
*** 
(.0023) 
-0.6027*** 
(.0041) 
-0.9942** 
(.0148) 
-1.0023** 
(.0140) 
-0.9635** 
(.0359) 
-1.0167** 
(.0331) 
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NANALt  0.2013
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1985*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1906*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1906*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1631*** 
(.0001) 
 0.1845*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt* Xt3  0.3139
*** 
(.0001) 
 0.3133*** 
(.0001) 
0.1985** 
(.0227) 
0.2024** 
(.0202) 
-0.0144 
(.1128) 
0.0327 
(.7829) 
Adjusted R2 0.2537 0.2562 0.3694 0.3784 0.3794 0.3877 
 
When estimating the coefficient standard errors, we use White‟s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity as 
well as a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote p-values < 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
Full sample 2 includes DQF_ONLY (n = 2,335) firm-year observations and no-forecast (n =10,900) firm-year 
observations and excludes any observations with annual forecasts. Restricted sample 2 includes only DQF_ONLY 
firm-year observations. 
LNFt and PRECt in the 2SLS models (Columns 5 and 6) are the fitted values from the first-stage regressions in the 
Appendix. The sample size in the 2SLS models is smaller due to additional data requirements for the first-stage 
regressions. 
See Table 2, Panel A for definitions of the other variables.  
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Table 6 
Regression analyses on the effect of forecast horizon (short-vs. long-term) on the FERC 
 
Variable 
Full sample  
OLS (n = 18,253) 
Restricted 
sample  
OLS (n = 7,353) 
Restricted  
sample  
2SLS (n = 6,482) 
Column 1 
F1 = DLFt 
 
Column 2 
F1 = DCFt 
  
Column 3 
F1 = DCF_ONLYt 
F2 = DLF_ONLYt 
F3 = DCL_JOINTt 
Column 4 
F1 = DCL_JOINTt 
Column 5 
F1 = DCL_JOINTt 
Intercept 0.2193
*** 
(.0001) 
0.2274*** 
(.0001) 
0.2304*** 
(.0002) 
0.1167*** 
(.0011) 
0.0837** 
(.0356) 
Xt-1 -0.8646
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.7736*** 
(.0001) 
-0.7645*** 
(.0001) 
-1.0054*** 
(.0001) 
-1.1019*** 
(.0001) 
Xt 1.2619
*** 
(.0001) 
1.2088*** 
(.0001) 
1.1946*** 
(.0001) 
1.3086*** 
(.0001) 
1.2545*** 
(.0001) 
Xt3 0.4340
*** 
(.0001) 
0.4033*** 
(.0001) 
0.4116*** 
(.0001) 
1.1256*** 
(.0001) 
1.1392*** 
(.0001) 
Rt3 -0.1070
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1143*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1144*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0979*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0693*** 
(.0001) 
F1 0.0115 (.5902) 
-0.1147*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1208*** 
(.0001) 
0.0614*** 
(.0034) 
0.0519*** 
(.0002) 
F1 * Xt-1 -0.3837
* 
(.0570) 
-0.2529*** 
(.0025) 
-0.2537*** 
(.0035) 
0.0025 
(.9902) 
-0.1080 
(.8527) 
F1 * Xt -0.0781 (.7176) 
0.1288 
(.2465) 
0.1701 
(.1505) 
0.3465 
(.1383) 
0.2518 
(.2180) 
F1 * Xt3 0.2928
*** 
(.0001) 
0.3903*** 
(.0001) 
0.3889*** 
(.0001) 
0.2304** 
(.0383) 
0.1738** 
(.0383) 
F1 * Rt3 -0.1065
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0097 
(.1594) 
0.0195*** 
(.0057) 
-0.1310*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1508** 
(.0001) 
F2   0.0852 (.1687)   
F2 * Xt-1   -1.0006
** 
(.0402)   
F2 * Xt   0.8369 (.1614)   
F2 * Xt3   0.1992 (.3306)   
F2 * Rt3   -0.0192 (.6923)   
F3   -0.0566
** 
(.0146)   
F3 * Xt-1   -0.3697
* 
(.0937)   
F3 * Xt   0.0996 (.6678)   
F3 * Xt3   0.5172
*** 
(.0001)   
F3 * Rt3   -0.1127
*** 
(.0001)   
SIZEt -0.0908
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0883*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0890*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0859*** 
(.0001) 
-0.0907*** 
(.0001) 
SIZEt* Xt3 0.1041
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0994*** 
(.0001) 
0.0994*** 
(.0001) 
0.0051 
(.8227) 
-0.0399 
(.7208) 
LOSSt -0.2141
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.2094*** 
(.0001) 
-0.2091*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1582*** 
(.0001) 
-0.1467*** 
(.0001) 
LOSSt* Xt3 -0.9071
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8272*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8319*** 
(.0001) 
-0.5533*** 
(.0001) 
-0.5858*** 
(.0001) 
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GROWTHt 0.0011
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0011*** 
(.0001) 
0.0011*** 
(.0001) 
0.0018*** 
(.0001) 
0.0018*** 
(.0001) 
GROWTHt* Xt3 0.0003
*** 
(.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(.0001) 
0.0001*** 
(.0001) 
0.0004** 
(.0021) 
EARNSTDt 2.2012
*** 
(.0001) 
2.2644*** 
(.0001) 
2.2561*** 
(.0001) 
2.5554*** 
(.0001) 
2.7062*** 
(.0001) 
EARNSTDt*Xt3 -0.7161
*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8046*** 
(.0001) 
-0.8326*** 
(.0001) 
-1.6368*** 
(.0001) 
-1.9448*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt 0.1795
*** 
(.0001) 
0.1932*** 
(.0001) 
0.1930*** 
(.0001) 
0.1547*** 
(.0001) 
0.1604*** 
(.0001) 
NANALt* Xt3 0.2325
*** 
(.0001) 
0.2796*** 
(.0001) 
0.2782*** 
(.0001) 
0.0147 
(.7524) 
-0.0716 
(.8887) 
Adjusted R2 0.2614 0.2676 0.2693 0.3396 0.3518 
 
 
When estimating the coefficient standard errors, we use White‟s (1980) method to correct for heteroskedasticity as 
well as a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years for a given firm (Petersen 2009). 
Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote p-values < 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively.  
DLFt = 1 if a management EPS forecast for a future fiscal year (or for quarters in future fiscal year) is issued during 
fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DCFt= 1 if a management EPS forecast for the current fiscal year t (or for quarters in fiscal year t) is issued during 
fiscal year t, 0 otherwise; 
DLF_ONLY = 1 if only a management EPS forecast for a future fiscal year (or for quarters in future fiscal year) is 
issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise, (so if DCF = 0 and DLF = 1, then DLF_ONLY = 1); 
DCF_ONLYt= 1 if only a management EPS forecast for the current fiscal year t (or for quarters in fiscal year t) is 
issued during fiscal year t, 0 otherwise, (so if DCF = 1 and DLF = 0, then DCF_ONLY = 1); 
DCLt_JOINT = 1 if both a management EPS forecast for the current fiscal year (or for quarters in the current fiscal 
year) and a management EPS forecast for a future fiscal year (or for a quarter in the future fiscal year) are 
issued during fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise; and  
DCL_JOINTt in 2SLS (Column 5) is the fitted value from the first-stage regressions in Appendix. 
The sample size in 2SLS is smaller due to additional data requirements for the first-stage regressions. See Table 2, 
Panel A for definitions of the other variables.  
 
 
 
  
 
